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Profit Maximization, Win Optimization and Soft Budget Constraints 
in Professional Team Sports  
Introduction  
The business of professional team sports is not an ordinary business. The competitive 
environment and the character of the product are indeed peculiar, which explains why 
consumers and producers behave differently from economic actors in other industries. 
In a ground-breaking article, Neale (1964) identified the need for uncertainty regarding 
the outcome of sporting contests as the reason for the many peculiarities of North 
American professional team sports, which takes place in closed leagues organized by 
monopolies. However, the peculiarities of team sport business in North America 
compared to the normal business enterprise are not related to different motivations and 
different underlying goals. The owners of team sport franchises are profit maximizers as 
other enterprises.    
 
In Europe, the business of professional team sports is equally peculiar when measured 
by the yardstick of the typical business enterprise. However, it is radically different 
from North American team sport businesses in terms of competition and regulation. In 
at least one respect, the European context is even more peculiar than its North American 
equivalent in the sense that profit maximization does not appear to be the ultimate 
motive of enterprise behavior. Rather, the pursuit of ‘win maximization’ seems to 
determine the decision making of the professional European team sport enterprise. The 
pursuit of the best possible sporting results is superior to any other motives in all team 
sport clubs independent of whether it is a non-profit voluntary organization or a for-
profit business enterprise. The professional team sports club in Europe is perceived to 
maximize its wins under a break-even constraint. As long as costs do not exceed 
revenues, clubs are doing whatever they can to be as successful as possible in its 
respective leagues. 
 
There is much empirical evidence in support of this view. European team sport clubs do 
not seem to be motivated by profit. They normally do not earn profits and they 
definitely do not maximize profits. They rather seem to do what is seen as required for 
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sporting success independent of profit implications. However, does that mean that they 
maximize wins under a break-even, or zero deficit constraint? This is often not the case. 
Many professional team sport clubs seem to pursuit sporting success without bothering 
about any budget constraints. Their accounts show persistent deficits and growing debts. 
Despite these problems, the clubs have an abnormally high survival rate. When in 
financial trouble, the vast majority are bailed out, saved by rich individuals (‘sugar 
daddies’) or the government or its private creditors. The expectation of being saved in 
case of financial problems affects the behavior of professional team sport clubs. They 
behave as if there is no need to balance the books. They act as if it is not a threat to the 
survival of the company to operate financial losses. In other words, their budget 
constraints are soft. They do not seem to care about profits but maximize sporting 
success within budget constraints, which are soft in the sense that they expect that 
expenditures in excess of revenues can be covered in various ways ex post.       
 
The phenomenon of soft budget constraints exists at all levels of professional team 
sports. However, paradoxically, the phenomenon prevails more often when clubs are 
rich. Often, the higher revenue streams the clubs earn, the higher are the deficits. The 
phenomenon is particularly evident in top-level European professional football. The 
richest leagues operate the largest accumulated losses. This chapter mainly refers to 
football but the phenomenon of soft budget constraints also exist in other professional 
team sports in Europe, such as basketball, ice hockey, handball and rugby.     
      
Why are the budget constraints of professional team sport businesses often soft? Why is 
the degree of ‘softness’ different in different contexts? What are the mechanisms that 
explain the phenomenon of soft budget constraints? Why do saviours save loss making 
sport clubs from financial collapse? How prevalent is the phenomenon?  
 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions. The chapter is structured as follows: 
The first section outlines the background for the prevailing win optimization theory. 
The second section presents evidence, which indicates that something different from 
win optimization under a break-even constraint is at play. The third section is a general 
presentation of the syndrome of soft budget constraints, which is followed by a 
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discussion of the institutional preconditions and the social and emotional attachment in 
European professional team sports. The next section provides examples of six different 
forms of ‘softness’, which is followed by two case studies and a concluding section.        
Win optimization rather than profit maximization 
For-profit business enterprises normally not only try to survive but also attempt to earn 
a profit. In case of no profits or lower profits compared to alternative uses of capital, the 
investor is expected to withdraw from the firm in favour of investing in another. This 
means that in order to survive the firm will have to maximize profits, and in economic 
theory businesses are assumed to behave in such a way that their profits are maximized. 
Real-life business enterprises do not always follow this behavioural rule. They may 
instead prioritize growth of market share, or they may ‘satisfice’ rather than optimize 
(Simon, 1979), which means that they do not pursue optimal but rather satisfactory 
solutions. They may be non-profit social enterprises who primarily pursue social aims 
and invest surpluses back into the business itself. They may also aim for shared value, 
i.e. a combination of profit maximization and the creation of societal value beyond what 
the effects on the company’s balance sheet (Porter and Kramer, 2011). 
 
Increasingly, European professional team sport clubs have become business enterprises 
with capital injections by owners and sometimes flotations on stock markets. Arguably, 
this has caused major changes in the functioning of the clubs. They have become 
commercialized in practice and in rhetoric (Horne, 2006; Storm, 2010). Focus has 
shifted to give priority to maximization of revenue streams such as sponsorships, media 
rights, merchandise, luxury seating, branding and diversified services. Professional 
management and labour markets have emerged, and corporate governance has become a 
hot topic. Further, new economic and managerial discourses of club management linked 
to commercialization have emerged. However, profits are seldom and in any case 
insignificant. Increasing revenues lead to similar or even larger increases in 
expenditures. If maximization of profits is what motivates and guides owners of 
professional team sport clubs they are not very successful and it is difficult to 
understand why anybody would want to invest in such an unrewarding line of business.    
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These phenomena have puzzled sport economists. Some advocate direct application of 
mainstream economic theory including an assumption of profit maximizing club owners 
(Dobson & Goddard, 2001; Sandy, Sloane, & Rosentraub, 2004). However, others 
conclude that “owners are just as likely to be win-maximizing sportsmen” (Vrooman, 
2007, 353). Indeed, a consensus seems to have emerged that clubs rather behave 
according to a win optimizing motive (Garcia-del Barrio & Szymanski, 2009). Club 
owners are assumed to disregard return on capital and rather give priority to doing 
whatever is needed to become as successful in the relevant sporting contests as possible. 
If this means zero profits so be it. However, it is assumed that club owners do not want 
to lose the invested capital so win optimization with a zero deficit constraint is seen as 
prevalent. 
 
Fort (2000) disagrees with the argument. He maintains that European professional 
football clubs are in fact profit maximizers. However, there is ample evidence that win 
optimization rather than profit maximization characterizes European professional team 
sports (Garcia-del Barrio & Szymanski, 2009).  
 
Comparisons with North American major leagues have contributed to this emphasis on 
the European peculiarities (Andreff, 2011). The North American leagues are closed with 
no relegation and promotion whereas European leagues are open. The North American 
leagues are local monopolies with strong entry barriers. They impose limits to player 
mobility and have measures designed to level out the competitive strength of individual 
clubs such as a reverse-order-of-finish draft. They redistribute income by pooling TV 
rights sale at the league level. The leagues are cartels exempted from the American anti-
trust regulation. These conditions are favourable for profit maximization whereas the 
competitive structure of open leagues in Europe encourages win optimizing behaviour. 
 
There are obvious historical reasons for this contrast. Whereas major leagues in North 
America were pure market phenomena from the start, the European context is radically 
different. Professional team sport originates from voluntary organizations in civil 
society who have maintained an influence on league structures. The contemporary 
structures have emerged gradually and still reflect the influence of their emergence, the 
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overall competitive structure is still heavily influenced by its past and the major 
European leagues are still more or less linked to the inherited civil society 
organizations. 
Persistent losses but high survival rate1  
Arguably, the assumption of win optimization is highly valuable in attempts to 
understand the business of professional team sports and explain the behaviour of club 
owners in Europe. It explains why increasing revenues result in equivalent increasing 
costs. Or, as Tottenham Hotspur’s former owner Alan Sugar famously expressed it 
when commenting on a new windfall Premier League TV rights deal: “It is like prune 
juice. It will go in one end and out the other” 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/31391778). 
 
However, it does not explain why win optimization behaviour often persists without any 
break-even constraint. In their pursuit of sporting success, owners often accept deficits 
leading to debt and loss of capital. This is reflected in persistent losses in professional 
European team sport clubs.   
 
According to UEFAs club licensing benchmarking report (UEFA, 2010), more than 
50% of all top division clubs in Europe have operating losses. In 28% of the clubs 
salaries alone constitute more than 120% of revenues.  
 
The situation is much worse in the major European leagues. The English Premier 
League is the richest and most popular league in Europe. It has experienced phenomenal 
revenue growth rates following the unilateral decision of clubs in prevision first division 
in 1992 to break away from the Football League. The Premier League has since taken 
advantage of increasingly lucrative television rights deals and experienced a growth in 
revenues of more than 900% in the period between 1992 and 2007. Even so, the 
business has not been profitable (Hamil & Walters, 2010). All of this increased revenue, 
and still more, has been used on players’ salaries or transfers, leaving no profits. In fact, 
there has in this period not been one single year in which the Premier League has 
                                                 
1 This section is based on Storm & Nielsen (2012). 
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generated an aggregate pre-tax profit for the Premier League clubs (Hamil & Walters, 
2010).  
 
There are similar trends in other European countries. Italian football is a prime example 
of financial chaos and poor management (Morrow, 2006; Szymanski & Zimbalist, 
2006). There have been persistent and increasing operating losses in all Serie A clubs. 
From 1996/1997 to 2006/2007 the accumulated losses of Italian Serie A clubs amounted 
to a total of €1.4b, even before transfer deficits were taken in to account (Hamil et al., 
2010. The player’s salaries increased more than 700% in the top 6 clubs from 1996 to 
2002 alone (Baroncelli and Lago, 2006).  
 
Spanish football is another case of persistent deficits (Garcia & Rodriquez, 2003; Boscá 
et al, 2008). The first tier league has experienced large and strongly growing revenues 
similar to the English Premier League. However, the clubs are spending even larger 
amounts on player salaries and transfers, resulting in rising levels of debts. In spite of 
the booming revenues, several Spanish clubs have been threatened with closure due to 
overspending. Almost half of the clubs in the first and second divisions are in serious 
trouble when measured on factors such as indebtedness, capacity to refinance debts, and 
expenditure on players seen in relation to operating revenues (Barajas & Rodriguez, 
2010). For instance, in 2008, the aggregate losses in the two top tier leagues were a 
staggering €2.8m (Andreff, 2007). 90% of the clubs operated with an aggregate loss, 
with nine clubs being technically insolvent. Total salaries were 99% of revenues in the 
top tier and 98% in the second tier (Barajas & Rodriguez, 2010). This situation is not a 
novel phenomenon. In Spain, accumulated operating results have always been negative, 
and more than half of the clubs are operating in the red each and every year (Boscá et al, 
2008).  
 
The situation in France is less serious although aggregate operating losses also 
characterize French football (Andreff, 2007). In the period 1997-2007, the aggregate 
losses in the top tier French football league was €298 m.  
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Germany is the exception. The Bundesliga is clearly the most profitable of the major 
European football leagues and player’s salaries constitute a much lower share of 
revenues than in the other major leagues (Deloitte, 2011). This has no doubt to do with 
the specific ownership structure in German football. Apart from a few exceptions where 
companies own the clubs (VfL Wolfsburg, Bayer Leverkusen and TSG 1899 
Hoffenheim), all German top clubs have 51% member ownership.  
 
However, despite the economic hardships outlined above, the history of European 
football is also a history of extremely high survival rates (Kuper & Szymanski, 2009; 
Szymanski (2009) compared with business firms in general. Despite the chronical 
deficits, there have been only three cases of tier 1–4 insolvency in English football since 
1985 (Beech et al, 2010). In 1923, the Football League consisted of 88 teams organized 
in four divisions. 97% of them still existed in the 2007/08 season, and 54 % were in the 
same division as they were in 1923 (Kuper & Szymanski, 2009). In comparison, only 20 
of the top 100 English companies in 1912 remained in the top 100 in 1995 (Szymanski). 
 
The survival rate of Italian football clubs is also extremely high. Of the 60 clubs playing 
in the top Italian League from its inauguration in 1929 until 2010, 58 clubs are still in 
existence. It is remarkable that 20 of the 36 top two tier league teams in 1929 are still 
playing in the two best tiers. In recent years, some Italian top clubs have been relegated 
due to financial collapse. However, it is noteworthy that all of them have reemerged 
after being reconstructed.  
 
Spanish football clubs have also had high rates of survival, although not as high as in 
the English and Italian leagues. In total, 13 of 20 clubs (65%) playing in the best or 
second best tier in 1929 were playing in one of these tiers in 2009 which arguably 
indicates  a high rate of survival. 
 
Why is the survival rate so extraordinarily high among professional European football 
clubs, who almost always operate with operating losses and accumulates debt? We 
propose that the paradox can be understood as a consequence of the prevalence of soft 
budget constraints in the sector. This argument is developed in the following sections 
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with a brief introduction to the concept followed by an account of the prevalence of soft 
budget constraints and a discussion of the conditions that lead to soft budgets in the 
European professional team sport clubs. 
Soft budget constraints – theory and practical relevance 
What is a soft budget constraint? The concept was originally developed by the 
Hungarian economist Kornai in order to understand the phenomena of widespread 
shortage and inefficiency in socialist economic systems, and, in particular, the failure of 
attempts to reform the system (Kornai, 1980; Kornai, Maskin and Rolland, 2003). Later, 
Kornai applied the approach in efforts to understand the post-socialist transition 
economies (Kornai, 2001), and the concepts have been used to explain a multitude of 
phenomena in capitalist economies as well (Kornai, Maskin and Rolland, 2003). The 
soft budget constraint phenomenon describes a situation in which firms survive even 
when they repeatedly run a deficit from their operations. Environmental economic 
actors more or less systematically bail them out.  
 
However, it is not the phenomenon of bail outs in itself that constitutes the syndrome of 
soft budget constraints. The ex post act of saving a firm from collapse is often sensible 
when seen in isolation and this does not in itself constitute a problem unless it has ex 
ante behavioral implications. The phenomenon of soft budget constraints constitutes a 
syndrome if firms expect that they can rely on external financial support if they run into 
financial trouble. If this is the case, they will not bother much about profits or even 
about balancing the books. They will pay less attention to efficiency, and hoard scarce 
resources as it will practically be costless to accumulate too much, and focus on 
strengthening the relationship with the supporting organizations rather than properly 
manage the resources of the firm. In the classic socialist system, managerial incentives 
to be efficient or create innovative products were heavily distorted due to 
institutionalized ex ante expectations of ex post support if the firm in question failed to 
meet its planned financial goals.     
 
In contrast to socialist societies, Kornai (1986) argues that, in general, the capitalist 
economies are dominated by hard budget constraints, in the sense that firms operating in 
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a free market environment cannot generally rely on survival through bailouts from 
external supporters. Instead, they will face bankruptcy if they do not ensure efficient 
and optimized operations and do not curb spending in case of deficits. In other words, 
capitalist firms can only survive in the long term if they seriously master the 
relationship between their sales and costs and pay utmost attention to efficiency.  
 
In an ideal sense, hard budget constraints ensure creative destruction of inefficient 
organizations and a high level of innovation and high quality of products.  
Kornai outlines five main criteria for assessing whether firms face hard or soft budget 
constraints. Firms are facing hard budget constraints when the following conditions are 
met: (H1): The firm is a price-taker for both inputs and outputs; (H2): The firm cannot 
influence the tax rules and no individual exemption can be given concerning the volume 
of tax or dates of collection; (H3): The firm cannot receive any free state or other grants 
to cover current expenses or as contributions to finance investment; (H4): No credit 
from other firms or banks can be obtained (all transactions are made in cash); and (H5): 
No external financial investment is possible, i.e. investments are dependent on retained 
profits. 
 
If all of these conditions are fulfilled, the firm in question is constrained on its budget in 
a hard way. However, this extreme situation only exists in exceptional circumstances. 
Generally, H4 and H5 are not fulfilled in monetary economies with developed financial 
systems. Further, H1 presupposes absence of firms with market power, i.e. capacity to 
influence the market price. There are many exceptions to H1 in capitalist economies. In 
practice, the efficiency driving budget hardness in capitalist economies is seen as linked 
to hardness in relation to H2 and H3. In general, firms are unable to influence their tax 
payments and will not be able extract negotiated subsidies from the state contrary to 
powerful state-owned companies in socialist economies. Paradoxically, an extreme case 
of ideal-type hardness existed in the former socialist economies where the household 
sector experienced hardness in relation to all five criteria with absence of consumer 
credit in addition to hardness with respect to the other criteria.     
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In fact, there are numerous examples from capitalist economies of firms facing 
relaxations on several of the conditions of hardness listed above including H2 and H3, 
thus showing that the soft budget constraint syndrome is not a phenomenon found 
exclusively in socialist or post-socialist economies. In capitalist economies, large scale 
(usually public) organizations such as the military, public transport, hospitals, and also 
the banking sector, is shown to be facing significant relaxations of hardness. Generally, 
if an organization is seen as ‘too big to fall’ by its stakeholders there is a strong motive 
to save it in case of trouble and the behavior of the organization then reflects an 
expectation of bail outs.     
Soft budget constraints in European professional football 
Even though some European clubs behave as win maximizers subject to a break-even 
constraint, many are facing environmental conditions that effectively result in a high 
survival rate despite continuous financial problems (Storm and Nielsen, 2012, 2015). 
Bankruptcies are seldom and only seem to occur for clubs in the second or lower 
divisions. Normally, state bailouts and sugar daddies come to the rescue and/or creditors 
accept debt arrears and non-payment of debt. 
 
Using Kornai’s (1986) framework, we distinguish between six types of softness. Soft 
pricing (S1), soft taxation (S2), soft subsidies (S3), soft credit (S4) and soft investment 
finance (S5) represent relaxations of each of Kornai’s five conditions of hardness. We 
add another category: Soft accounting (S6). In the following paragraphs, we will present 
a range of examples that illustrate the different mechanisms of softness in European 
professional football.    
 
Soft pricing (S1) takes place when a public stadium and/or training facility is made 
available to football clubs at below market fees and when governments or city councils 
buy naming rights to stadia at above market prices (see case 3 below). This has 
happened in many countries, including Spain, Italy and Denmark.  
 
Soft taxation (S2) takes the form of tax exemptions and non-payment of taxes, non-
enforcement or amnesty of tax debt. There are numerous examples of soft taxation in 
[11] 
 
Spain (Barajas & Rodríguez, 2010) and Italy (Foot, 2006). For instance, Lazio was 
saved from collapse in a major rescue operation in 2015 by means of a relaxation of its 
tax obligations. The club reached an agreement with the Italian tax authorities of paying 
a €140m tax liability over an extended period of 23 years to avoid the club from 
immediate closure (Foot, 2006, 491-499)  
 
Soft subsidies (S3) come in either open or hidden forms provided by governments or 
rich ‘glory seekers’ to reduce deficits and pay off debts to keep clubs running in 
situations of severe financial problems. This has happened often in English (Grant, 
2007) and French football (Andreff, 2007), but there are also numerous examples in 
other parts of Europe. Other subsidies take the form of access to guaranteed income-
generating schemes such as football pools, inflated sponsorship deals and other indirect 
subsidies. 
 
Soft credits (S4) are reflected in the acceptance of overdrafts, unpaid bills and non-
enforcement of repayment arrangements with routine postponement and rescheduling of 
debt. Often the most prominent clubs enjoy very soft forms of credit (Ascari & 
Gagnepain, 2006). 
 
Soft investments (S5) exist, for instance, when the government or other sponsors pay 
for a part, or perhaps all, of the costs when clubs build new stadia or other revenue-
boosting infrastructure.  
 
Finally, soft accounting (S6) takes the form of discretionary, and even illegal, praxis, 
with the purpose of bypassing rules and creative fulfillment of legal conditions and 
credit criteria to fool the creditors. This is often accepted or even, at least in Italian 
cases, encouraged by the government who has also in some cases changed legislation to 
facilitate softer accounting (Foot, 2006, 491-499). A recent study shows that the 
introduction of the UEFA Financial Fair Play rules has been followed by a reduction in 
the quality of financial statements of European football clubs (Dimitropoulos, 2015); 
the employment of earnings management, conditional accounting conservatism and 
auditor switching are used as indicators for accounting quality, and a study of 84 clubs 
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for a four-year period (2009–12) shows a decline in accounting quality in all three 
dimensions. Massaging of accounting is seemingly applied as a means to avoid FFP-
induced penalties without changing behaviour and actual financial outcome. 
 
According to Kornai, the soft budget constraints syndrome is an effect of vertical 
relationships between the state and economic micro-organizations. This reflects his 
primary focus on socialist and post-socialist economies. As a broader interpretation, a 
soft budget phenomenon can be said to reflect a relationship between an organization 
and its environment (Kornai et al, 2003).  
 
In the application of the soft budget constraint concept in the context of this chapter, the 
perspective is widened. The focus on vertical relations characteristic of a classical 
supporter-supported relationship is stretched to grasp a more complex situation where 
many types of stakeholders - not only public supporters, but also private investors, 
creditors or alike - in a firm are perceived by the firm as potential supporters, whereby 
expectations of ex post support can grow even though a vertical supporter-supported 
relationship does not exist ex ante in a formal sense.   
 
In the classical case, the organization experiencing soft budget constraints has an 
important societal role that serves or affects a large number of people. This has the 
effect that the supporter considers the organization as ‘too big to fall’ which translates 
into expectations of ex post support. Many European professional team sport clubs are 
similarly seen as ‘too big to fall’ by their stakeholders. 
 
By taking such an approach, it becomes possible to understand the paradox of European 
football. Several stakeholders, private and public, play from time to time the role as 
supporters of their respective clubs, thus establishing the conditions for development of 
the SBC syndrome in a sector normally perceived as capitalist and embedded in a 
horizontal environment but rather functioning as a supported firm in a vertically 
organized sector.  
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Storm & Nielsen argues (2012) that the emergence and institutionalization of the soft 
budget constraints syndrome in European football is due to two main factors: 1) the 
institutional mechanism of the European football market and 2) the specific emotional 
logic of sport focused on winning. We will touch upon the two in turn below. 
Institutions and social and emotional attachments  
The institutional framework regarding competitions is part of the reason for the 
existence of soft budget constraints in European professional football. The 
severe financial problems are at least partly due to the ruining conditions of competition 
in the European league structures enforced by: a) the open league structure; b) the 
unequal distribution of the league revenue; c) growing inequality between the first and 
second divisions in the domestic leagues; and d) an additional exogenous prize (e.g. 
participation in international competition) awarded to the winner of the domestic 
championship (Dietl, Franck and Lang, 2008). 
 
The problem of open leagues is well recognized in the sports economic literature. It 
represents a threat that pushes the (lower performing) clubs to invest in player talent in 
order to avoid relegation, which in turn exclude the clubs from the high revenues in the 
best league(s). Conversely, promotion increases revenues significantly. For clubs at the 
higher end of the sporting ladder, remaining in the top positions often induce investment 
in players to remain competitive in relation to lower level clubs. In addition, the 
existence of an exogenous prize in the form of participation in the Champions League, 
with promises of a significant hike of income, provides further incentives for 
investments by the top level clubs  
 
According to Dietl et al(2008), polarization between the clubs within and between 
leagues increases clubs willingness to gamble on success. A ‘bidding to bankrupt’, 
‘zombie2’ sporting arms race on players is the result, thus increasing the risk of deficits 
among the majority. In expectation of ex post support, weak performances -or a threat 
of relegation - are not met with reduced costs, but the opposite. In such a competitive 
environment, all club profits are easily competed away.  
                                                 
2 See: Franck (2013). 
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Such institutional mechanisms of the football market certainly create problems for the 
clubs. However, without the existence of significant softness it could not continue. It 
would break down the entire sector.  
 
The soft budget constraints syndrome helps to explain how the sector prevails despite 
growing debt and deficits. Or, put differently: If the clubs in general were facing hard 
budget constraints - with the consequences of failure when gambling on success in the 
sporting arms race - they would very likely curb their expenses thus finding their 
position in the league hierarchy with (at least) a break even budget constraint. The 
persistent overspending indicates the softening of budget constraints. 
 
A second main factor contributes to the syndrome is social and emotional attachments 
to sport. Football clubs are often markers of identity in their respective localities, not 
only for hardcore fans but also for citizens, in general, and politicians. The effects are 
often significant, because the clubs serve as a common flagship of reference and 
branding in the local context, which provides the club with resources to counter the 
threat of collapse, which is significant due to the ruining conditions of competition in 
the sector. 
  
The prestige attached to being part of European football also contributes to explaining 
the high survival of the clubs. Some investors are attracted to the sector because they 
see a professional team sports club as a kind of consumer good or because it put 
themselves in the spotlight of one the most media exposed popular sports. This 
constitutes another type of identity making.  
Case 1: Soft budget constraints and rescue operations in Spain 
The soft budget constraint syndrome is more entrenched among football clubs in Spain 
than in any other European country. In Spain, the popularity of football has resulted in 
several rescue operations to help financially distressed clubs. 
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In 1985 public authorities decided to help reduce debts in Spanish League clubs, which 
then exceeded €124m, through subsidies poured in from public football pools, A few 
years later, in 1992, when the Spanish clubs faced a new economic crisis, €192m of 
debts to the government were cancelled (Barajas & Rodríguez, 2010, 53). 
 
The local governments frequently steps in to bail out troubled clubs. The clubs are 
heavily backed by their respective regions, i.e. local governments and financial 
institutions (Barajas & Rodríguez, 2010, 53). Some of the regional governments 
sponsor the local club or buy their stocks in order to support it. In other cases stadiums 
have been sold to a willing City Council for large profits. In addition, local Spanish 
governments are aiding financially troubled clubs by buying or renting out stadia at 
subsidized prices. These examples of support from local and national state authorities - 
in the form of subsidies or cancellation of debts - support the notion that Spanish top 
clubs seem to be immune to financial downturns. If the clubs cannot make it themselves 
others will fix the problem, either by providing the necessary credit (through the bank 
sector) or by injecting public subsidies into the clubs. 
 
In response to a question asked in the Spanish parliament in July 2013, the Government 
was obliged to disclose the amount of unpaid tax owed by professional football clubs in 
the country's top two divisions. The sum was a staggering €663m (The Independent, 
2013). This should be seen in the context of the benefits from potential a European 
Union bailout potentially worth as much as €100bn and a government plan the year 
before for amnesty of football club debt to the state, which was blocked by Germany 
(EU Observer, 2012).  
 
The amount of unpaid tax did not include the tax debts of four clubs that are exempt 
because they were not obliged to reconstitute themselves as public limited companies 
and could continue to be owned by their members. Those four clubs are Real Madrid 
and Barcelona, who also take around 50 per cent of La Liga's total television revenue 
for themselves, as well as Athletic Bilbao and Osasuna.  
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However, the privileged status of the four exempted clubs is under threat from a 
European Commission investigation. The European Commission has opened three 
distinct in-depth investigations to verify whether various public support measures in 
favour of seven Spanish clubs, including Real Madrid and Barcelona, are in line with 
European Union state aid rules (European Commission, 2013). 
Case 2: Soft pricing and subsidies in Denmark - The case of Viborg 
FF  
Then evidence presented above indicates that softness mainly prevails in the largest 
European Leagues. However, smaller European football nations also face softness of 
budget constraints. The case of Viborg FF, a Danish professional football club currently 
playing in the best Danish league, shows how subsidies through soft pricing (S1) can be 
used to soften the budget constraints of football clubs.  
 
In 2008, Viborg FF was relegated to the second tier of Danish football and found itself 
in financial problems shortly after, and in 2010, the club was in close to collapse. The 
football club is located in a municipality that prides itself of the achievements of its 
football and handball teams. The clubs serve an important role as markers of local 
identity. In addition, in the part of where Viborg is located there is an intense 
competition among second tier cities to prevail in the Superliga, i.e. the top division of 
Danish football. The relegation and the subsequent deficits implied a threat of a decisive 
setback in this competition in case of reduced investment in player talent in order to 
reduce the deficit. In 2010 the football club was in need of an injection of a significant 
amount of cash (3m DKK) to balance the books.      
 
The local politicians were eager to find a way to help the club. The dynamic mayor was 
instrumental in developing and implementing a solution. It happened in a way which 
was by Danish standards pretty sophisticated. It took the form of indirect subsidies 
following two interconnected steps.  
 
 Viborg municipality sold the naming rights of the municipal stadium to Viborg 
FF for a period of five years at a price of  50.000 DKK 
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 Viborg FF then resold the naming rights to the municipal energy company, 
Energy Viborg (owned 100% by Viborg municipality) for 3m DKK for a period 
of three years. 
 
The transactions did the trick and Viborg FF received the support it needed. It happened 
through an indirect transfer of taxpayer money. Energy Viborg also subsequently 
suffered from the costly acquisition of the sponsorship.  
 
No doubt the mayor and his political allies would have preferred a lack of publicity 
regarding the transactions but this did not happen. Political opponents in the municipal 
council and among the board of directors of Energy Viborg exposed the deal in the 
media and sought clarification of the legality of the deal. In 2014, the Danish state 
administration concluded that the deal was a conscious attempt to subsidize a private 
business by illegal means.   
Conclusion and further perspectives 
European professional team sports suffer from the soft budget constraint syndrome. The 
Financial Fair Play (FFP) initiative of UEFA reflects a political awareness of the 
negative impacts on the management of clubs and the unfair effect on the terms of 
competition between clubs The FFP is designed to institutionalize a break-even 
constraint which will make it harder, and in the long run impossible, to operate with 
deficits and soft budget constraints (Franck, 2013; Pieper, this volume). The first data of 
the effects on the clubs in the English Premier League indicate that FFP has the desired 
effect (Cohen, 2015). Maybe, soft budget constraints are a thing of the past or at least a 
phenomenon of declining importance.  
 
There are many reasons why this is hardly the case. UEFA has experienced significant 
opposition and has diluted some of its regulation in response. Further, the long-term 
effects are uncertain. In addition, human imagination is borderless and successful 
attempts to counteract the intended effects of regulation will no doubt dampen the 
effects.  
 
[18] 
 
As far as the prevalence of soft budgets, a comparison with the North American major 
leagues may be useful. Storm & Nielsen (2015) identify similarities between European 
and North American professional team sports when seen through the prism of the soft 
budget constraint theory. The study shows that expectations of rescue in case of 
financial trouble and the associated effects on firm level efficiency do not prevail in the 
USA and Canada. However, American major leagues experience softness of budgets in 
ways that are remarkably similar to the European experience and with similar distortion 
of resource allocation. North American leagues receive ex ante support which are in in 
many ways similar to the ex post support representing the six types of softness.  
Recommendations 
The following contributions are essential for the understanding of the soft budget 
constraint approach and how it can be applied in order to understand professional team 
sports: 
 Andreff, W. (2015): Governance of professional team sports clubs: agency 
problem and soft budget constraint, in In W. Andreff (Ed.), Disequilibrium Sport 
Economics: Competitive Imbalance and Budget Constraints,  Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
 Franck, E. (2013), Financial Fair Play in European Club Football: What is it all 
about?, International Journal of Sport Finance, 9 (3), 193-217. 
 Storm, R. K., & Nielsen, K. (2015). Soft Budget Constraints in European and 
US leagues – similarities and differences. In W. Andreff (Ed.), Disequilibrium 
Sport Economics: Competitive Imbalance and Budget Constraints, 151–171. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
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